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Abstract
This note argues that the continental shelf between Greece and Turkey should be delimited
under general principles of international law. Part I discusses the present dispute and its historical
underpinnings. Part II examines the relevant treaty and customary international law applicable
to continental shelf delimitations. Part III analyzes the positions of the parties and proposes a
solution under principles of customary international law. This Note concludes that the continental
shelf should be delimited by drawing a median line between the two states giving half effect to
Eastern Islands and then adjusting the line to avoid enclaving them.

DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
IN THE AEGEAN SEA
INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 1987, a Turkish seismic research vessel, the
Sismik I, escorted by warships and jetfighters, prepared to sail
for disputed waters around the Greek islands of Lesbos, Lemnos, and Samothrace.' The proposed expedition exacerbated
the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea appurtenant
to the two countries. 2 At stake in this dispute are the legal
rights to explore and exploit the potentially rich reserves of oil
and gas underlying the Aegean seabed.' The longstanding historical animosities between the parties make it unlikely that
they will be able to negotiate a resolution."t
This Note argues that the continental shelf between
Greece and Turkey should be delimited under general principles of international law. Part I discusses the present dispute
and its historical underpinnings. Part II examines the relevant
treaty and customary international law applicable to continental shelf delimitations. Part III analyzes the positions of the
parties and proposes a solution under principles of customary
1. Cowell, Greece and Turkey Alert Forces as Tension Builds on Oil Search, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 1; see A Nasty Squall in the Aegean, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 4,
1987, at 38 (referring to the Sismik I as an oil prospecting ship); Carr & Demirsar,
Greece, Turkey Defuse Aegean Face-Off but Fight Over TerritorialLimits Persists, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 30, 1987, at 15, col. 5.
2. Coweli, supra note 1.
3. See Phylactopoulos, Mediterranean Discord. Conflicting Greek-Turkish Claims on the
Aegean Seabed, 8 INT'L LAW. 431 (1974). During exploratory drills the North Aegean
Petroleum Company (the "NAPC") discovered "heavy" oil in October 1971 and substantial quantities of natural gas in December 1972 off the island of Thassos. The
aggregate oil capacity translates into 900,000 tons of good quality oil per year. Id. at
432.
The Greek government granted a license to the NAPC, a private international
consortium with partners from Canada, the United States, and the Federal Republic
of Germany. Letter from Permanent Representative of 'rurkey to United Nations
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/18759 at 1 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Turk. Letter].
Turkey granted permits to the Turkish State Petroleum Company for 27 maritime
areas beyond the six-nautical-mile territorial water limit of the Greek islands. Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.CJ. 3, 7 (Interim Protection Order of
Sept. 11).

4. See Carr & Demirsar, supra note 1. See generally Clogg, Troubled Alliance: Greece
and Turkey, in GREECE IN THE 1980s 123 (R. Clogged. 1983).
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international law. This Note concludes that the continental
shelf should be delimited by drawing a median line between
the two states giving half effect to the Eastern Islands and then
adjusting the line to avoid enclaving them.5
I. CONFRONTATION IN THE AEGEAN. DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DISPUTE
The origins of the dispute between Greece and Turkey
over the Aegean seabed can be traced back to the early 1970s,
when Turkey granted petroleum exploration permits in the
Aegean Sea over areas of seabed that Greece claimed belongs
to its islands. 6 In February 1974, Greece, in a Note Verbale sent
to Turkey,7 questioned the validity of the licenses granted by
Turkey, reserved its sovereign rights over the continental shelf
adjacent to the coasts of the Greek islands, and contended that
delimitation between the two states be made on the basis of a
median line:' Turkey replied by Note Verbale° that the Greek
islands close to the Turkish coast do not possess a continental
5. See infra text accompanying notes 145-47 for a definition of half effect and
note 218 for a listing of the Eastern Islands. Enclave means to surround or enclose
the continental shelf of one country with the continental shelf of another country.
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

597 (2d ed. 1979).

6. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings 21
(Greek Note Verbale of Feb. 7, 1974) [hereinafter Greek Note Verbale of Feb. 7,
1974]. The Turkish government granted petroleum exploration permits over areas
west of the Greek islands on October 18, 1973, and the Official Turkish Gazette published the announcement on November 1, 1973. Id. The Turkish government later
extended the area for exploration further west by its decision of July 2, 1974, and the
Official Turkish Gazette published that announcement on July 18, 1974. Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings 28 (Greek Note Verbale of
Aug. 22, 1974) [hereinafter Greek Note Verbale of Aug. 22, 1974]. Greece had
granted exploration permits in the same areas since 1961. Greek Note Verbale of
Feb. 7, 1974, supra, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 21.
7. Greek Note Verbale of Feb. 7, 1974, supra note 6, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 21.
A Note Verbale is a diplomatic communication prepared in the third person and unsigned. It is designed to show that a matter is not urgent, but at the same time it has
not been overlooked. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1326
(2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2029 (2d ed.
1979).
8. Greek Note Verbale of Feb. 7, 1974, supra note 6, 1976 I.CJ. Pleadings at 22;
see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 8 (Judgment of
Dec. 19). For a definition of median line under conventional law see infra note 79.
9. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 IC.J. Pleadings 23
(Turkish Note Verbale of Feb. 27, 1974) (French version), 2 MEDITERRANEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF 1519 (1988) (unofficial English translation of Turkish Note Verbale)
[hereinafter Turkish Note Verbale of Feb. 27, 1974].
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shelf of their own, disputed the applicability of a median line,
and sought to reach a solution by agreement.' 0
According to Greece, delimitation could be accomplished
by applying the principles enunciated under the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf (the "Geneva Convention")."
Turkey expressed readiness to enter into negotiations;' 2 nevertheless, in May 1974 a Turkish vessel began an exploration
program in the Aegean Sea.' 3 In February 1975, Greece and
Turkey agreed to draft a special agreement to enter into negotiations over the question of the Aegean Sea continental
shelf.' 4 The Joint Communiqu6 Issued After the Meeting of
Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey (the "Brussels Communique"), 15 was issued in May 1975. It stated that the delimitation of the continental shelf should be resolved peacefully by
negotiations and by the International Court of Justice (the
"ICJ" or the "Court").' 6 However, the parties subsequently
7
failed to agree on the delimitation of the continental shelf.'
On August 6, 1976, Turkey dispatched the research ship
Sismik I to the Aegean Sea to carry out seismological explorations of portions of the continental shelf that Greece claimed
as its own.' 8 Four days later, in view of what Greece called the
"dangerous situation created for peace and security in the
Eastern Mediterranean as a result of arbitrary and provocative
10. Id. at 23, 2 MEDITERRANEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF at 1520-23; see Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 8.
11. Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
12. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.CJ. at 8.
13. See id. The Greek government vigorously protested the following month by
Note Verbale. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings
26 (Greek Note Verbale ofJune 14, 1974). The Turkish government refused to accept the protest and repeated its suggestion of negotiation. Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.Cj. Pleadings 27 (Turkish Note Verbale of July 4,
1974) (French version), 2 MEDITERRANEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF 1526 (1988) (unofficial English translation of Turkish Note Verbale); see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978
I.CJ. at 8.
14. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.Cj. at 9.
15. May 31, 1975, Greece-Turkey [hereinafter Brussels Communique], reprinted
in U.N. Doc. S/18766 at 5 (1987).
16. Id.
•17. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.Cj. at 10.
18. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.Cj. 3, 7 (Interim
Protection Order of Sept. 11); see 31 U.N. SCOR (1949th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.1949 (1976) [hereinafter S.C. 1949th mtg.].

1988]

AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF

acts by Turkey against Greece," 19 the Greek government asked
for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council
and referred the matter to the ICJ.20 The relationship between
Greece and Turkey was already tense because of the Turkish
presence in Cyprus since 1974.21

On August 25, 1976, the Security Council adopted Resolution 395,22 calling on the two governments to exercise re-

straint and to reduce tensions. 23 It asked Greece and Turkey
to resume direct negotiations and appealed to them to do
everything within their power to reach mutually acceptable solutions. 24 Resolution 395 further invited the two governments
to consider appropriate judicial means, such as the ICJ, for settling their legal differences.25
In its application, Greece asked the ICJ to declatre that the
Greek islands 26 possess a continental shelf as part of the territory over which Greece exercises sovereign rights and to adjudge the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to the
19. S.C. 1949th mtg., supra note 18, at 1.

20. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1976 I.C.J. at 12; see Gross, The Dispute Between
Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 31

(1977) (discussing Greece's appeal to the Security Council and the ICJ to effect settlement of the Aegean Sea continental shelf boundary dispute).
21. S.C. 1949 mtg., supra note 18, at 2. OnJuly 15, 1974, Greek-officered units
of the Cypriote National Guard overthrew the elected Cypriote government. On July
20, 1974, Turkish forces invaded Cyprus and occupied 40% of the island. Robertson, Turkey Lands an Armed Force in Cyprus; Drops Paratroopersinto Nicosia Sector, N.Y.
Times, July 20, 1974, at Al, col. 7. See generally, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-

(Comm. Print 1975) (report of
Sen. Pell).
22. S.C. Res. 395, 31 U.N. SCOR (1953d mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32
(1976).
TIONS, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., GREECE AND CYPRUS

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.

26. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 4 (Interim
Protection Order of Sept. 11). Greece specifically asked the Court to adjudge and
declare the Greek islands specified in the Greek Application of August 10, 1976, a
territory of Greece and that these islands are entitled to the continental shelf that
appertains to them. Id. The specified islands are Samothrace, Limnos, Aghios Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara, Antipsara, Samos, Ikaria, and all the islands of the Dodecanese group. Id. at 6; see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976
I.CJ. Pleadings 3, 10 (Greek Application of Aug. 10) [hereinafter Greek Application
of Aug. 10, 1976]. The Dodecanese group includes the islands of Patmos, Leros,
Kalimnos, Kos, Astypalaia, Nisiros, Tilos, Simi, Chalki, Rhodes, Karpathos, Kassos,
Lipsi, Castellorizo, Levitha, Arki, Alimia, and Agathonision. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF GREECE 3 (1983).
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two countries in the Aegean Sea.2 7 Greece further petitioned
the Court to declare that Turkey must discontinue activities on
the Greek continental shelf.28 Pending the final decision of the
ICJ, Greece asked the Court to provide interim measures of
29
protection.
While Turkey did not appear before the ICJ, it sent a letter
to the Court asking it to dismiss the request for interim measures of protection and to remove the case from the Court's
list.3 0 Turkey claimed that Greece's application for interim
measures was premature because they were not required to
protect Greece's rights and that the Court lacked jurisdiction
over the case because Turkey had not appointed an agent to
represent it before the Court.3 '
The ICJ held that Turkey did not have to appear for the
Court to indicate interim measures of protection.32 However,
the ICJ denied Greece's request for interim injunctive relief,
because the denial would not cause irreparable prejudice to
the parties. 3 3 The Court reasoned that Turkey's seismic exploration did not involve any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil of the Aegean Sea or to its natural resources.3 4
Further, the Court refused Turkey's request to remove the
case, leaving determinations ofjurisdiction and the actual merits to a later time.35
On November 11, 1976, while the case was pending
before the ICJ, Greece and Turkey signed the Agreement on
Procedures for Negotiations of Aegean Continental Shelf Issue
(the "Berne Agreement' ")36 in Berne, Switzerland. The parties
agreed to conduct negotiations in good faith on the delimitation of the continental shelf.5 7 They further agreed to abstain
from any initiative or act that might prejudice the negotia27. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1976 I.C.J. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 10; see Note, Oil Exploration in the Aegean, 93 L.Q. REV. 29 (1977) (discussing ICJ's denial of Greece's request for interim measures of protection).
35. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1976 I.G.J. at 13.
36. Nov. 11, 1976, Greece-Turkey [hereinafter Berne Agreement], reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 13 (1977) .
37. Id. art. 1, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 13.
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tions38 or discredit the other party.3 9 Finally, the parties
agreed to study state practice and international rules, and to
identify principles and practical criteria useful in the delimita40
tion of the continental shelf.

In 1978, the ICJ addressed the question of whether it had
jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits.4" According to
article 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,4 2
when a party does not appear before the Court or fails to defend its case, the Court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction
over the case and that the claim is well founded in fact and
law.43
Greece argued that Turkey had consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction on the basis of two agreements. 44 First, Greece and
Turkey had agreed to the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the "1928 Act"),45 a treaty
providing that all disputes between the parties be submitted to
the ICJ.4 0 Second, the parties had issued the Brussels Communiqu, 4 7 which provides that problems of relations between the
two countries be negotiated peacefully and, specifically, that
the dispute of the continental shelf be resolved by the ICJ. 48
38. Id. art. 6, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 13.
39. Id. art. 7, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 13.
40. Id. art. 8, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 13.
41. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 7 (Judgment
of Dec. 19); see Note, Limits of Consent: The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 18 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 649 (1977) (examining issue of whether ICJ has jurisdiction over the case).
42. June 26, 1945, art. 53, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062, T.S. No. 993, at 32, 3 Bevans
1179, 1190 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
43. Id.
44. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.CJ. at 14.
45. Sept. 26, 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 345 [hereinafter 1928 Act].
46. Id. art. 17, at 351. Article 17 states in part:
All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be made under
Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the parties agree, in the manner hereinafter provided,
to have resort to an arbitral tribunal.
Id. Article 17 of the 1928 Act states that disputed matters be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. However, this was later changed by article 37 of
the ICJ Statute, which refers matters of the Permanent Court of International Justice
to the ICJ. ICJ Statute, supra note 42, art. 37, 59 Stat. at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30, 3
Bevans at 1187; see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 14.
47. Brussels Communiqu6, supra note 15; see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,
1978 I.C.J. at 39.
48. Brussels Communiqu6, supra note 15.
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The Court refuted both of Greece's claims and refused to
consider the application filed by Greece.4 9 The ICJ concluded
that the 1928 Act did not apply to the present dispute because
Greece expressly excluded from the Court's jurisdiction disputes relating to its territorial status. 50 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that the Brussels Communiqu6 was not intended to constitute a commitment by the two governments to
accept unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Court.5 1 Rather,
the parties intended first to conclude a special agreement defining the issues to be resolved before they jointly accepted the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. 52 Although negotiations floundered
following the ICJ's decisions of 1976 and 1978, the two nations
refrained from any overt acts in the Aegean Sea until 1987.
In February 1987, a private international consortium that
was granted a license by Greece announced its intent to begin
drilling for oil in late March 1987, in disputed waters in the
Aegean Sea.53 Greece asked the consortium to postpone its
drilling plans5 4 and, in February 1987, submitted to the Greek
Parliament a draft law authorizing it to buy a majority of the
consortium's shares.5 5 The Greek prime minister and Greek
secretary of industry and energy claimed that the purpose of
49. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 38, 44.
50. Id. at 37; see Greek Accession to the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes of 1928, Sept. 14, 1931, 111 L.N.T.S. 414. In full, the Accession excludes the following:
(a) Disputes resulting from facts prior either to the Accession of Greece
or to the accession of another Party with whom Greece might have a dispute;
(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes relating
to the territorial status of Greece including disputes relating to its rights of
sovereignty over its ports and lines of communication.
. I
Id. at 414-15.
51. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 IC.J. at 44.
52. Id. at 43-44.
53. 1987 Turk. Letter, supra note 3, at I.
54. Kraloglou, The Prinos' Case Enflames the New Crisis, To Vima, Mar. 29, 1987, at
36.
The Greek government sent a letter to the North Aegean Petroleum Company
informing it that for national reasons it was urgent that they postpone drilling. Id.
55. Letter from Permanent Representative of Greece to United Nations Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/18766 at 1 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Greek Letter].
The law was finally passed by the Greek Parliament on May 4, 1987. The new
law allowed for negotiations between the Greek government and the North Aegean
Petroleum Company, to be followed by a government buyout. See Greece Plans Oil
Takeover, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at D20, col. 1.
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the buyout was not to expropriate the consortium's-investment
but rather to safeguard the national resources located at places
of national importance and security.5 6 They also claimed that
control of the consortium would enable the Greek government
to decide "how, when and where" to drill.57 Turkish officials
claimed that the plan indicated an intention by Greece to proceed with the drilling. 58 Subsequently, the Turkish government sent an oceanographic research vessel, the Piri Reis, into
international waters off the Greek island of Thassos early in
March 1987 and prepared the Sismik I to set sail later that
month.59
II. DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LA W
Although the term "continental shelf" finds its origins in
the geological, geographical, and oceanographical sciences,60
it has not had any real legal significance until this past half century. 61 The idea that a country can claim rights to exploration
and exploitation over the natural resources of the subsoil and
seabed beneath the high seas and contiguous to its coasts was
first enunciated in 1945 in the Policy of the United States with
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed
of the Continental Shelf (the 'Truman Proclamation" or the
"Proclamation"). 62 The Proclamation declared the continental
shelf to be an extension of the coastal state and naturally appurtenant to it.63 It justified exploitation of the continental
56. See Greece Plans Oil Takeover, supra note 55; Kraloglou, supra note 54.
57. 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55.
58. Cowell, supra note 1, at A4, col. 4.
59. Id. But see Cowell, Greeks and Turks Ease Aegean Crisis, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29,
1987, at Al, col. 5 (parties agreeing to refrain from further drilling).
60. M. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (1952).
61. Howard, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the
Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 324 (1981).
62. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948). A few isolated claims by
other nations existed prior to 1945, however the Truman Proclamation was the first
to invoke worldwide attention and set a precedent for other states to follow. See
Howard, supra note 61, at 324-25.
63. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. at 68.
Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United States that the
exercise ofjurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed
of the continental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just ...
since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass
of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it ....

98 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 12:90

shelf first by making reference to the worldwide need for new
sources of petroleum and minerals.6 4 Second, it pointed to the
modern technological progress that has made utilization of
these new sources practicable.6 5 Third, it stated that jurisdiction over these resources is required to ensure their conservation and prudent utilization.6 6
A. Treaty Law on the Continental Shelf
1. The Geneva Convention of 1958
The Convention of the Continental Shelf, 67 opened for
signature in Geneva on April 29, 1958, was the first general
multilateral convention to define the term "continental
shelf."' 68 Article 1 of the Geneva Convention defines "continental shelf" as the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coast of
a state, outside its territorial waters, and to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that limit to a depth of feasible exploitation. 6 9
Article 1 states that the concept of a continental shelf also applies to islands.7 0 The ICJ has stated that article 1 reflects
rules of customary international law 71 and is, therefore, binding as law on all states. 72 The Geneva Convention entered into
Id.
64. Id. at 67.
65. Id. at 67-68.
66. Id. at 68.
67. Geneva Convention, supra note 11.
68. Howard, supra note 61, at 326.
69. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. at 473, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, at 3, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312. Article 1 states in full:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used
as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of
the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Id.
70. Id. art. 1(b), 15 U.S.T. at 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, at 3, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312.
71. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 39 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. Section 102 summarizes sources of
international law as follows:
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force on June 10, 1964, 71 and has been signed by forty-five
states."4 Turkey has neither signed nor acceded to the Geneva
Convention.7 5 In acceding to the Geneva Convention in 1972,
Greece made a reservation to the system of delimiting the continental shelf as provided for in article 6.76
Although neither party considers itself bound by article 6,
it addresses one of the methods of delimiting the continental
shelf common to opposite or adjacent states under international law. 77 The article states that in the case of opposite
states, absent agreement or special circumstances, the boundary of their common continental shelf is the median line between them. In this situation, a line is drawn equally distant
from the baseline78 of each opposite state.79 In the case of adjacent states the method of lateral equidistance applies. In this
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by
the international community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal
systems of the world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto
and may lead to the creation of customary' international law when such
agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted.
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not
incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may
be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.
Id.
73. See
TUS AS AT

MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STA-

DEC. 31, 1987, at 728, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, U.N. Sales No.

E.88.V.3 (1988) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].

74. id.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see Accession No. 7302 to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Nov.
6, 1972, 847 U.N.T.S. 338 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Accession]. But see Greek
Note Verbale of Feb. 7, 1974, supra note 6, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 22, where Greece
stated that the delimitation of the continental shelf is based, both in theory and practice of international law, on the median-line method as provided in article 6, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Convention.
77. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 6, 15 U.S.T. at 474, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316; see infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
78. The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea has
been defined as "the low water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal State." Third United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Convention]. Greece has
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situation, a line is drawn equally distant from the baseline of
each adjacent state.8"
2. UNCLOS III and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
The United Nations General Assembly convened the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS III") in 1973 to review the entire law of the sea. 8 1 UNCLOS III intended to resolve certain questions left unanswered by customary international law, such as the breadth of
the territorial sea, the fishery zone, and the precise method of
claimed application of the normal baseline system for the purpose of measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea. Geneva Convention Accession, supra note 76, at 338.
Turkey has claimed straight baselines. Act Concerning the Territorial Sea, No.
476, art. 4 (Turk. 1964) [hereinafter Law No. 476] reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION
AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, THE HIGH SEAS AND TO FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING

RESOURCES OF THE SEA 128, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, U.N. Sales No.
E/F.70.V.9 (1970). Straight baselines is a method of joining appropriate points in
localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut ino, or if there is a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, in drawing the baseline from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 1982 Convention, supra, art. 7(1), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
79. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 6, 15 U.S.T. at 474, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316. Article 6(1) states in full:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the' territories of two or
more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement
between them. In absence of agreement, and unless another boundary is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from

which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Id.
80. Id. Article 6(2) states in full:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall
be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
Id. Thus the difference between the two methods is that the median line is measured
from the baselines of the coasts of opposite states and the lateral equidistance line is
measured from the baselines of the coasts of adjacent states. However, both the median-line and the lateral-equidistance-line methods have been referred to as the principle of equidistance. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 37 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
81. See 9 S. JAGOTA, MARITIME BOUNDARY 28 (1985).
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delimiting the continental shelf 8 2 Despite the Geneva Convention, the means of continental shelf delimitation remained
an issue of intense controversy 8 3 because the ICJ had previously held that the delimitation provisions embodied in article
6 of the Geneva Convention
do not reflect rules of customary
84
international law.
After prolonged negotiations, UNCLOS III agreed upon
the precise outer limits of the continental shelf and approved
the concept of a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea surrounding each state.8 5 On April 30, 1982, UNCLOS III adopted the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (the "1982
Convention") 6 by a vote of 130 in favor, 4 against, and 17
abstaining. 7 Greece voted in favor of the 1982 Convention,
while Turkey voted against it.8 8 Although the 1982 Convention allows a maximum territorial sea of twelve nautical
miles,8 " Greece and Turkey each presently claim a territorial
sea of only six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea. 90
82. See id. at 57.
83. See id.
84. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.Cj. at 38.
85. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, arts. 3, 76, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1272,
1285; see 9 S. JAGOTA, supra note 81, at 29-30.
86. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, reprinted in 21 'I.L.M. at 1261.

87.

REPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS

CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 592-93 (Occasional Paper No. 33, 1983). The
four states voting against were Israel, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. Id.
88. Id.
89. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, art. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
90. Law No. 230 (Greece 1936), reprinted in LAws AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 18, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, U.N. Sales No.
1957.V.2 (1957); Law No. 476, supra note 78, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
TREATIES RELATING TO'THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, THE HIGH SEAS AND TO FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA at 128. However, Turkey has claimed 12 nautical miles of terri-

torial waters in the Black Sea. Protocol Concerning the Establishment of Territorial
Waters in the Black Sea, Apr. 17, 1973, USSR-Turkey, reprinted in THE LAW OF THE
SEA - MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS at 191, U.N. Sales No. E.87.V.12 (1987); see
also, Law No. 476, supra note 78, art. 2, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF, THE HIGH SEAS AND TO FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES
OF THE SEA at 128 (in cases of neighboring states whose territorial sea is of breadth
greater than six nautical miles, Turkey's territorial sea is determined by reciprocity);

Regulations of 5 August 1960 for the Protection of the State Frontier of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, as amended in 1971, art. 3, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE ,LAW OF THE SEA at 34, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16, U.N. Sales No. E/F.74.V.2 (1972) (the USSR has claimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles).
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Article 76(l) of the 1982 Convention defines "continental
shelf" as the submarine seabed and subsoil that form the natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal state. 9'
The outer limits of the continental shelf are measured by the
outer edge of the "continental margin."92 Where the distance
between this outer edge and the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured is less than two hundred nautical miles,
the coastal state can claim up to two hundred nautical miles of
93
continental shelf.
The 1982 Convention is less specific: than the Geneva
Convention for delimiting the continental shelf between states
with opposite or adjacent coasts. During the negotiations, one
group of nations, including Greece, favored the median-line
and lateral-equidistance methods.9 4 Another group, including
Turkey, emphasized that "equitable principles, taking into account all circumstances," should be the main consideration. 9 5
91. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, art. 76(1), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
Article 76(1) defines the continental shelf as
[t]he sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
[the coastal state's] .. .territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
Id.
92. Id. The continental margin is defined as comprising "the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of
the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its
oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof." Id. art. 76(3), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
93. Id. art. 76(1), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1285; see supra note 91.
94. See Chiu, Some Problems Concerningthe Application of the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Between Adjacent or Opposite States, 9 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 4-5 (1985).
Greece's draft proposal on the question of the delimitation between states reads:
1. Where the coasts of two or more States are adjacent or opposite to
each other, the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries shall be determined by agreement among themselves.
2. Failing such agreement, no State is entitled to extend its sovereignty
over the continental shelf beyond the median line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines, continental or insular,
from which the breadth of the continental shelf of each of the two States is
measured.
Greece: Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf, 8(3) U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
at 202, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.25 (1974).
95. Chiu, supra note 94, at 5. Turkey's draft proposal reads in its entirety:
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The final version, embodied in article 83,96 is a compromise
between the two views. On the one hand, it omits reference to
the median-line and lateral-equidistance methods in the text;
on the other, it refers only to the broad phrase "equitable solution" rather than to any specific "equitable principles." 9 v Article 83 further states that parties with a common continental
shelf should delimit "by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable
solution."

98

Because the term "equitable solution" is subjec-

tive, application of article 83 allows for development by inter1. Where the coasts of two or more States are adjacent and/or opposite, the continental shelf areas appertaining to each State shall be determined by agreement among them, in accordance with equitable principles.
2. In the course of negotiations, the States shall take into account all
the relevant factors, including, inter alia, the geomorphological and geological structure of the shelf up to the outer limit of the continental margin, and
special circumstances such as the general configuration of the respective
coasts, the existence of islands, islets or rocks of one State on the continental shelf of the other.
3. The States shall make use of any of the methods envisaged in Article
33 of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as those established under
international agreements to which they are parties, or other peaceful means
open to them, in case any of the parties refuses to enter into or continue
negotiations or in order to resolve differences which may arise during such
negotiations.
4. The States may decide to apply any one or a combination of methods
and principles appropriate for arriving at an equitable delimitation based on
agreement.
Turkey: Draft Article on Delimitation Between States, 8(3) U.N. Conference on the Law of

the Sea at 201, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.23 (1974).
96. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, art. 83, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1286. Article 83(1) states that "[t]he delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution." Id.
97. Id.; see Chiu, supra note 94, at 4-5.
98. 1982 Convention, supra note 78, art. 83, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1286. Article 38 of the'ICJ Statute states in full:
1. The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whethergeneral or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
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national case law. 99
As of December 9, 1984, the closing date for signature,
159 states and entities had signed the 1982 Convention.' 0 0
Greece signed the 1982 Convention; Turkey did not.'
The
1982 Convention has not yet been ratified or acceded to by the
requisite number of states, therefore it has not entered into
force. 0 2 Nevertheless, the 1982 Convention is significant be0 3
cause it is a general convention codifying the law of the sea.1
Thus, the ICJ can look to the 1982 Convention as a source of
10 4
international law even though the parties have not ratified it.
B. General Principles of Delimiting a Continental Shelf Under
InternationalCase Law
In recent years, the ICJ and other international tribunals
have considered a number of cases brought by states that wish
to delimit the boundaries of their common continental shelf.
The relevant judgments form an important body of legal interpretation of the Geneva and 1982 Conventions. They also
clarify issues of customary international law, which is binding
on all states.
1. The North Sea Case
In the landmark

1969 decision, North Sea Continental

ICJ Statute, supra note 42, art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30, 3 Bevans at
1187.
99. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
100. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 73, at 735-36; see also Status of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1108 (1987).
101. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 73, at 736.
102. As of December 31, 1987, 35 states and entities had ratified or acceded to
the 1982 Convention. Id. Greece has not ratified it. See id. The Convention will
come into force one year after 60 states ratify Ior accede to it. 1982 Convention, supra
note 78, art. 308, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1327.
103. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.CJ. at
294. The ICJ ascertains the principles and rules of international law by reference to
" 'general conventions,' including, inter alia, the conventions codifying the law of the
sea to which the two States are parties." Id. at 291. The ICJ referred to the 1982
Convention as a source of international law on the continental shelf because it "may
nevertheless be regarded as consonant at present with general international law on
the question." Id. at 294.
104. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 72, comments (l)(b), (3); see also
MacRae, Customary InternationalLaw and the United Nations'Law of the Sea Treaty, 13

CAL.

W. INT'L L.J. 181 (1983) (stating that the 1982 Convention has codified principles of
customary international law of the sea with almost unanimous international consent).
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Shelf, 10 5 a dispute arose between West Germany and its adjacent states, the Netherlands and Denmark, concerning the delimitation of their common continental shelf in the North Sea.
The ICJ set out the fundamental rule of law relating to the continental shelf as codified in article 2 of the Geneva Convention.
The Court held that the rights of the coastal state over its continental shelf exist ipsofacto and ab initio.'0 6 In other words, the
rights of the coastal state are inherent and exclusive, by virtue
of its sovereignty over the land, and the state need not perform
any special legal acts to protect those rights. 07 The Court further held that the process of delimitation is essentially one of
drawing a boundary line between areas appurtenant to one or
more of the affected states.10 8 Thus, while delimitation may
not grant an equal share to each state, it should create an equitable effect.' 9
The Court also stated that the principle of natural prolongation determines what constitutes a state's continental
shelf. 0 Natural prolongation is the "continuation of the land
territory or domain, or land sovereignty of the coastal State,
into and under the high seas via the bed of its territorial sea
which is under the full sovereignty of that State."' ' l The
Court reasoned that the continental shelf belongs to a state not
because of proximity to it, but because the2 continental shelf is
a natural extension of its land territory."1
105. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
106. Id.at 22.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 22, 31.
111. Id.at 31.
112. Id. One of the methods suggested by the Netherlands and Denmark for the

delimitation of the common continental shelf of states with opposite or adjacent
coasts was the "equidistance-special circumstances" rule, reflecting the language of
article 6 of the Geneva Convention. Id. at 19-20. The "equidistance-special circum-

stances" rule draws a boundary line by means of an equidistance line, except where
special circumstances exist. Id.
The Court recognized the difficulties of applying an equidistance line in the case
of opposite or adjacent states. It stated that a lateral equidistance boundary between
adjacent states may leave to one of the states concerned "areas that are a natural
prolongation of the territory of the other." Id. at 37. It found the median-line
boundary of opposite states easier to apply, because where the natural prolongations
of opposite states meet and overlap the line effects an equal division of the particular
area involved. Id. at 36.
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The Court suggested that articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Geneva Convention, which define the nature and limits of the
'
continental shelf, are rules of customary international law.

3

In contrast, the Court did not accept the median-line and lateral-equidistance methods, enumerated in article 6 of the Geneva Convention, as the exclusive means of delimiting the continental shelf. Specifically, the Court stated that article 6 was
t4
not an emerging rule of customary international law."
The Court discussed equitable principles as a means of
determining continental shelf boundaries, noting that any
method of delimitation can lead to relative injustices." 5 According to the Court, equity does not imply equality between
the states or a complete refashioning of natural geography.
Rather equity attempts to abate the effects of an incidental spe11 6
cial feature from which unjustifiable treatment could result.
The equitable factors that the ICJ considered relevant to the
North Sea dispute included the natural prolongation of the land
territory, the geographical configuration of the coasts, the
presence of any special or unusual features, the physical and
geological structure and natural resources of the continental

shelf areas involved, and the reasonable degree of proportionality given the length and general direction of the coast.'

17

2. The Gulf of Maine Case
Fifteen years after the North Sea decision, the ICJ reiter113. Id. at 39. These articles define the outer limits of the continental shelf, the
nature of the rights that can be exercised over the continental shelf, the juridical
character of the coastal state's entitlement, the kind of natural resources to which
these relate, the legal status of the waters over the shelf as high seas, and the remaining legal status of the superjacent air-space. Id. Although the Court did not specifically mention islands, the concept that a continental shelf also applies to islands is
included in the Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(b), 15
U.S.T. at 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, at 3, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312.
114. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 38.
115. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 49-50.
117. Id. at 51-52. Following the ICJ decision, West Germany entered into
agreements with the Netherlands and Denmark that, in effect, extended the hypothetical equidistance line with a parallel sideways shift outwards toward the Netherlands on one side and Denmark on the other, thus allowing West Germany more
continental shelf. Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
Under the North Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, Denmark-West Germany, 857 U.N.T.S. 109;
Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea,
Jan. 28, 1971, Netherlands-West Germany, 857 U.N.T.S. 131.
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ated, in the Gulf of Maine1 8 case, that the median-line and lateral-equidistance methods of delimitation are not the exclusive
methods of delimiting the continental shelf. 119 The United
States and Canada, both of whom are' parties to the Geneva
Convention, asked the ICJ to determine the course of the single maritime boundary that divides the continental shelf and
fishery zone in the Gulf of Maine area.12 0 The Court stated
that the fundamental norm governing maritime delimitation,
whether effected by direct agreement or by the decision of a
third party, must be based on the application of equitable criteria and the use of practical methods capable of ensuring an
12
equitable solution. 1

The Court made reference to conventions, international
custom, and judicial decisions to arrive at the principles of law
that govern maritime delimitation. 2 2 The Court stated that
there can be no systematic definition of the equitable criteria
that must be considered, because they necessarily vary from
case to case.' 23 However, the Court listed five equitable criteria that should serve as guidelines to delimitation. First, the
land should dominate the sea. 124 Second, overlapping areas of
continental shelf appertaining to neighboring states should be
equally divided, except where special circumstances require
correction. 25 Third, the seaward extension of a state's coast
should not encroach on another state's coastline. 26 Fourth, a
court should seek to prevent a cutoff of the seaward projection
of the coast of the state concerned. 27 Fifth, a court should
consider any inequalities between the coasts of the two
118. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
119. Id. at 303.
120. Id. at 246.
121. Id. at 312-13.
122. Id. at 290. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute specifies what principles the ICJ
should apply in deciding disputes. See supra note 98.
123. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.C.J. at
312.
124. Id. This concept was set forth in the North Sea case as the natural prolongation or continuation of land territory under the high seas. See supra text accompanying note 111; see also Collins & Rogoff, The InternationalLaw of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 34 MAINE L. REV. 1, 33 (1982).
125. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.C.J. at
312-13.
126. Id. at 313.
127. Id.
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states. 12 8 In addition, the Court enumerated special circumstances or auxiliary criteria to modify these basic criteria. 2 9
Specifically, the Court mentioned the difference in the coastal
length of the states involved,' 30 referred to the Tunisian-Libyan
case,' 3' where the coasts of the two states were adjacent in certain places and opposite in others, 32 and, referred to the pres33
ence of geographical features such as islands.1
The Court further suggested three. practical methods to
effect delimitation. 3 4 First, a court may draw either a lateral
equidistance line for adjacent coasts or a median line for opposite coasts. 35 Second, a court may draw a. line perpendicular
to a coast or general direction of a coast that extends to the
limits of the continental shelf. 136 Lastly, a court may extend
the method of an existing division of territorial waters, the direction of the final segment of a land boundary, or the overall
direction of such boundary. 3 7 The Court concluded that its
object was to select the criteria it regarded as the most equitable, as well as the methods that would best permit concrete
38
implementation.
C. The Effect of Islands in the Delimitation Process
It is a recognized rule of customary international law that
islands possess a continental shelf.' 39 Less clear, however, is
128. Id.
129. Id. at 328.
130. Id. at 322, 328.
131. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Judgment of Feb. 24); see infra text accompanying notes 170-178.
132. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.CJ. at
324.
133. Id. at 328.
134. Id. at 313.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 312.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
Under article 121 of the 1982 Convention, the continental shelf of an island is
determined in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 Convention applicable to
other land territory. However, rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life have no continental shelf.
Article 121, on the regime of islands, states in part:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3... the continental shelf of an
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the boundary effect to be given to islands that lie between two
or more opposite or adjacent states. States have generally asserted rights' over the continental shelves of their islands.' 40
Thus according to'state practice, 14 1 an island lying within a
state's territorial sea is given full effect. 142 That is, the offshore
island is used as the outer basepoint of the state to which it
belongs. 4 3 Islands'that lie proximate to their state, but beyond its territorial sea, are given half effect only.' 4 4 The
method of half effect consists of delimiting the median line between the two coasts twice.' 45 First, a median line is drawn
between the two states without the use of the offshore island as
a basepoint, and second, the median line is redrawn with the
offshore island as a basepoint. 146 The boundary drawn midway
14 7
between the two median lines gives half effect to the island.
island [is] . ..determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no ... continental shelf.

1982 Convention, supra note 78, art. 121, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
140. D. BOWETr, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 140

(1979).
141. State practice is what states have done, or abstained from doing, in the
international field. For example, that a state has claimed certain rights over a continental shelf, or recognized such rights claimed by other states would be considered
state practice. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 58
(1972).
142. D. BOwETr, supra note 140, at 176-77. Professor Bowett supports his proposition that the effect to be given an island depends on its distance between two
states with evidence from nine bilateral agreements and the Anglo-French case. Id. at
177 nn.94-99. A series of bilateral agreements concluded over a period of time by
various states, all consistently adopting the same solution to the same problem of the
relationships between them may give rise to a new rule of customary international
law. H. THIRLWAY, supra note 141, at 59.
143. See United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case-First Decision (U.K. v.
Fr.), 54 I.L.R. 6, 115 (1977).
144. D. BOWETr, supra note 140, at 176-77. Even though Professor Bowett uses
the term partial effect, the agreements used to support his conclusion actually give
half effect to the islands.
145. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 124; see Continental
Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.CJ. 18, 89 (Judgment of Feb. 24).
146. In other words, one line is drawn giving the island no effect and one line is
drawn giving the island full effect. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54
I.L.R. at 124.
147. The delimitation line may also be a bisector of the angle produced by the
first two lines, or the island can be treated as displaced toward its state by half its
actual distance therefrom. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982
I.Cj. at 89. For examples of half effect, see infra text accompanying notes 163-67 &

175-78.
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Islands midway between two opposite states may be given full
effect, almost full effect, or may be subject to reciprocal concessions. 48 Islands belonging to one state, but in close proximity to another state, may be given a diminished effect.' 4 9 Another solution is to enclave the islands. 50 The only instance in
which this solution has been adopted was with respect to the
Channel Islands in the Anglo-French case.' 5 '
1. The Anglo-French Case
152

153

In the Anglo-French case,. . the Court of Arbitration
considered the delimitation effect of islands in the English
Channel and the Atlantic Ocean beyond the United Kingdom
and France.I5 The court found article 6 to control the
method of delimiting the continental shelf in the Atlantic Region, 155 because both states are parties to the Geneva Convention.' 5 6 However, because of the French reservations to article
58
6,15 7 the court found it inapplicable to the English Channel
148. D. BOWETr, supra note 140, at 177. Professor Bowett gives as examples of
islands that are given full effect, the agreements between Indonesia/Malaysia and
Japan/Korea. For islands that are given less than full effect the author points to the
Indonesia/Australia agreement. For the islands that are subject to reciprocal concessions, the author points to the agreements between Italy/Yugoslavia, Iran/Saudi Arabia, and Iran/United Arab Emirates. Id. at 177 nn.96-98.
149. Id. at 177. As examples, Professor Bowett points to the agreement between Tunisia and Italy, Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, Tunisia-Italy, Aug. 20, 1971, 1978 I.T.G.U. 191, reprinted in THE LAW OF THE
SEA - MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS at 174, U.N. Sales No. E.87.V.12 (1987), and
the Channel Islands in United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 6. D.
BOWETT, supra note 140, at 177 n.99.
150. See supra note 5.
151. D. BOWETr, supra note 140, at 178; see infra text accompanying notes 16061.
152. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 6.
153. The United Kingdom and France agreed to form the Court of Arbitration,
each country nominating its own members to the court. Arbitration Agreement, July
10, 1974, France-United Kingdom, 1975 U.K.T.S. No. 137, at 3 (Cmd. 6280), 999
U.N.T.S. 142; see United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 6.
154. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 7.
155. Id. at 118.
156. Id. at 47.
157. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 73, at 729. When acceding to the
Geneva Convention, France did not accept application of the equidistance principle
to the English Channel. Id. For Greece's reservation to article 6, see supra note 76
and accompanying text.
158. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 52, 57.
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and instead applied customary international law.1 59
a. Channel Islands
The parties disputed the boundary consequences of the
British Channel Islands, which lie in the English Channel, directly off the coast of France. 6 0 The Court of Arbitration ignored the islands' presence and delimited the area by drawing
a median line from the baselines of the two opposite coasts.
The amount of continental shelf granted to the islands themselves extended in the north and west only as far as the boundary of their twelve-mile fishery zone, while the boundary extending from the east to the south-west was not specified by
the court.' 6' In making this determination, the court considered as important factors the islands' location, their size, and
their political and economic significance to the United King62
dom. 1

b. Atlantic Region
The Court of Arbitration also sought to remedy any distorting effect the British Scilly Islands would produce on a lateral equidistance line in the Atlantic Ocean.' 63 The Scilly Islands lie some twenty-one miles off the southwestern coast of
England.' 64 The court gave half effect to the Scilly Islands in
drawing the lateral equidistance line.' 65 Half effect was
achieved by drawing one lateral equidistance line disregarding
159. Id. at 100.
160. Id. at 74.
161. Id. at 102-03. The Court of Arbitration refers to this enclosure of the islands as an enclave. As a result, the continental shelf of the Channel Islands does not
connect with the continental shelf of the United Kingdom, but rather it is enclosed by
France's continental shelf. Id.
162. Additional factors that the court-took into account were the islands' population, id. at 96, their territorial seas and fishing regimes, id. at 94-95, the defense and
security interests of each nation-though these did not have a decisive influence on
boundary delimitation, id. at 98, and the geological continuity of the continental shelf

in the English Channel, id. at 70. The court did not treat the principle of natural
prolongation as absolute. It indicated that natural prolongation may be subject to
qualification in particular situations, as indicated by the use of the words "special
circumstances" in article 6 of the Geneva Convention and by the emphasis in prior
decisions on "equitable principles" in customary law. Id. at 99.
163. Id. at 121.
164. Id. at 123.
165. Id. at 125.
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the Scillies and a second line giving them full effect. 16 6 The
distance between the two equidistance lines determined the
maritime boundary. 16 7 However, the court applied full effect
to the French island of Ushant, which the court noted is no
more than ten nautical miles off the northwestern coast of
69
France 1 68 and within its territorial waters.'
2. The Tunisian-Libyan Case
The ICJ, in delimiting the continental shelf appertaining
to Tunisia and Libya, decided. to apply half effect to the
Kerkennah Islands off the coast of Tunisia. 170 The Court
adopted two different delimitation methods, one for the continental shelf near the coasts of Tunisia and Libya and one for
the area further offshore. ' 7 ' For the sector closer to shore, the
Court drew a lateral equidistance line perpendicular to the
coast. 72 For the sector further offshore, the Court took into
account the radical change in the general direction of the
Tunisian coastline in the Gulf of Gabes.' 7 3 Thus, the Court
applied a line parallel to the general direction of the Tunisian
coast alongside the Kerkennah Islands.' 74 The Court gave the
Kerkennah Islands, which are located about eleven miles off
the coast of Tunisia,' 7 5 half effect. 1 76 The Court treated the
islands as if they were displaced to the west, toward the mainland of Tunisia, by half the actual distance. 17 7 Thus, the
line between
boundary line was drawn parallel to a bisecting
178
Islands.
Kerkennah
the
and
coast
the Tunisian
166. Id. at 124.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 125.
169. Id. at 123.
170. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), !982 I.C.J. 18, 89
(Judgment of Feb. 24). In the Tunisian-Libyan case, Tunisia and Libya requested that
the ICJ delimit the continental shelf appertaining to each of those countries by considering equitable principles and relevant circumstances. Id. at 21.
171. Id. at 82.
172. Id. at 85-86.
173. Id. at 86.
174. Id. at 89.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 90. The Court considered as relevant circumstances the configuration of the parties' coasts, id. at 85, the presence of the islands, id. at 88, the land
frontier of the parties, id. at 85, prior conduct of the parties in granting concessions
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3. The Guinea/Guinea-BissauCase

The countries of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, both situated
in West Africa, disputed whether the numerous islands off the
coast of Guinea-Bissau should have any effect on their common maritime boundary.' 7 9 To determine what effect these islands would have on the delimitation process, the Arbitration
Tribunal' 8 divided the islands into three types.' 8 ' First, the
tribunal stated that "the coastal islands, which are separated
from the continent by narrow water courses and often joined
to it at low tide," are ar integral part of the continent. 8 2 Second, the tribunal considered another group of islands further
west of the coastal islands, the Bijagos Archipelago.18 3 The
territorial waters of this group are linked to each other and to
the territorial waters of the continent. 8 4 Third, the tribunal
used some of the more southerly islands for the establishment
of baselines and included them within the territorial waters.1 8 5
In essence, the tribunal considered the first and second
groups of islands as relevant in determining the general direction of Guinea-Bissau's entire coastline. 8 6 By taking into account these islands, the tribunal increased Guinea-Bissau's
coast length by twenty percent, thereby, in effect, treating the
parties' coastlines as equal in length.' 8 7 Noting first that the
equidistant method is one among many, the tribunal chose not
to apply it.18 8 Instead, it examined West Africa's coastline as a
89
whole, taking into account future delimitations of the region
and the possibility of enclaving Guinea's coast if the adjacent
in the area, id. at 83; see id. at 87, the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, id. at 91, and state practice, id. at 89.
179. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau
(Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), 25 I.L.M. 251 (1985). The dispute was complicated by
the existence of a century old boundary treaty negotiated by French colonizers. See
id. at 261, 263.
180. The Arbitration Tribunal was composed of three members of the ICJ. Id.
at 251.
181. Id. at 291-92.
182. Id. at 291.
183. Id. at 292.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 291-92.
186. Id. at 292.
187. Id. at 293.
188. Id. at 294, 297.
189. Id. at 297.
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state of Sierra Leone decided to delimit.' 9 0
In its final delimitation the tribunal applied the "southern
limit" of the Convention on the Delimitation of French and
Portuguese Possessions in West Africa (the "1886 Convention")' 9 ' to the area close to shore.' 9 2 The "southern limit" of
Guinea-Bissau, as embodied in the 1886 Convention, is latitudinal and allows 2.25 nautical miles of territorial waters to the
north of the island of Alcatraz. t9 3 The tribunal extended this
southern limit twelve nautical miles west of the island of Alcatraz to provide for the island's territorial waters under the
1982 Convention. 94 At this point the boundary line was
drawn in a southwesterly direction perpendicular to the line
joining Almadies Point, Senegal and Cape Shilling, Sierra Le195
one.
4. The Libyan-Maltese Case
On July 26, 1982, Libya and Malta requested that the ICJ
decide the principles and rules of international law applicable
to the delimitation of the area of continental shelf appertaining
to the two countries.' 9 6 The Court decided that a median line
190. Id. at 295, 297.
191. May 12, 1886, France-Portugal, 14 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2), 108
[hereinafter 1886 Convention], reprinted in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between

Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 25 I.L.M. at 273. The 1886 Convention established a
boundary separating the Portuguese possessions from the French possessions. However, the tribunal concluded that the 1886 Convention did not determine the maritime boundary between the two countries in West Africa. Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 25 I.L.M. at 289.
192. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 25

I.L.M. at 298. Guinea claimed that under the 1886 Convention negotiated by the
French, Guinea-Bissau had a southern limit 2.25 nautical miles above the island of
Alcatraz, which belonged to Guinea. Id. at 296. Without this "southern limit,"
Guinea-Bissau would claim more continental shelf under the lateral equidistance
line, but this would also have the effect of placing Alcatraz on the "wrong side" of the
lateral equidistance line. Id. at 295. In other words, the island of Alcatraz, which
belongs to Guinea, would be placed on Guinea-Bissau's side of the line.
193. Id. at 298.
194. Id.
195. Id. The tribunal accounted for the overall configuration of the West African coastline, thus involving two other states (Senegal and Sierra Leone) in the delimitation process. Id.
196. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 13, 15-16
(Judgment of June 3).
The parties agreed to allow the Court to apply principles of customary international law. Malta is a party to the Geneva Convention but Libya is not. Although
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between the two opposite states, with some adjustments,
would achieve an equitable solution. It estimated that the
boundary line lay somewhere between a northern limit, the
minimum shelf allowable to Malta, and a southern limit, the
maximum shelf allowable to Malta. The southern limit was determined by a median line drawn between Malta and Libya.' 97
The Court then reasoned that relevant circumstances dictated
a northward shift of this southern limit.' 98 The relevant cir-

cumstances were first, that Malta, being an independent island
state, appears as a relatively small feature compared to its
neighboring states in the semi-enclosed sea, and second, that
Libya's coast length is considerably longer than Malta's. 99 As
to the northern limit, the Court drew a median line between
Sicily and Libya. 20 0 The Court reasoned that if Malta were part
of the Italian territory and Italy and Libya decided to delimit,
even if minimum account were taken of Malta, the median line
would be south of this northern limit. 20 ' The Court assumed

that an equitable boundary between Libya and Malta must be
south of the hypothetical median line between Libya and Sicily.

20 2

The Court weighed these considerations and decided that
an equitable boundary line between Malta and Libya would be
three-quarters of the distance north of the
southern limit, thus,
20 3
one-quarter south of the northern limit.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS AND A SOLUTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Disputes Between Greece and Turkey
At present, Greece and Turkey are involved in two disputes. First, they disagree on the method of settling their
maritime boundary dispute.20 4 Second, they dispute what the
both Malta and Libya signed the 1982 Convention, it had not yet entered into force
and, therefore, was not binding on the parties. Id. at 29.
197. Id. at 51.
198. Id.

199. Id. at 51-52.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 51.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 52.
204. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 12 (Judgment of Dec. 19).
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proper continental shelf boundary in the Aegean Sea should
20 5
be.
1. Dispute Between the Parties: Method of Resolution
Greece wants to submit the question of the continental
shelf delimitation to the ICJ. 20 6 Turkey, however, wants to
continue negotiations in the context of the Berne Agreement.
Greece contends that the boundary dispute is a question
of law, not politics, and thus should be resolved on the basis of
customary and conventional international law. 20 8 Greece further contends that the Berne Agreement has become inactive
because Turkey has declared its intention to disregard international principles of law in negotiating the boundary dispute.2 0 9
Greece implies that Turkey has refused to accept the decisions
of the ICJ and international practice, as specified in the Berne
Agreement. 2 10 Turkey, for its part, considers the Berne Agreement operative and contends that Greece is responsible for the
lack of negotiations, because Greece terminated the negotiating process after the elections of the new Greek government in
1981 and indicated strong opposition to a negotiated settle21
ment.
2. Dispute Between the Parties: The Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf
At present, both parties claim six and not twelve nautical
miles of territorial waters around their land in the Aegean
205. Id.
206. 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55, at 4.
207. 1987 Turk. Letter, supra note 3, at 4.
According to Greek officials, during a meeting of experts in 1977, Turkey reversed its position and stated that the negotiations should be political and without
reference to international precedents or rules. 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55, at 2.
Greek officials stated that at a meeting of the secretaries-general of the respective
Ministries of foreign affairs in 1980, Turkey reiterated its position that international
law should not be taken into consideration, and, that although islands possess a continental shelf, the shelf should be restricted according to Turkey's claims. Id.
208. 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55, at 4.
209. See id. at 2; see also Berne Agreement, supra note 36, art. 8, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. at 13.
210. See 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55, at 4; see also Berne Agreement, supra
note 36, art. 8, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 13.
211. See 1987 Turk. Letter, supra note 3, at 2-3.
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Sea.21 2 Turkey has stated that it would consider it a cause for
war if Greece extended its territorial waters to twelve nautical
miles.2 1 3
Greece contends that all the islands under its sovereignty,
and in particular the islands in the eastern half of the Aegean
Sea near the coast of Turkey,21 4 are an integral part of its territory and that it is entitled to the continental shelf that appertains to them. 21 5 Greece argues that the delimitation should
be effected by a median line between the Greek islands and
such baselines on the Turkish coast established for delimiting
its territorial sea, so that equal division between the two areas
is achieved. 21 6 Greece takes the position that the rights of
coastal states over the continental shelf exist ipso facto and ab
initio, without the need for any legal or other action for recog2
nition. 7
Turkey has claimed rights to explore and exploit the continental shelf in the eastern half of the Aegean Sea, essentially
enclaving some of the eastern Greek islands (the "Eastern Islands")2 1 8 within their six-nautical-mile territorial sea. 2 19 Tur212. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Greece reserves the right to extend its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. 1982 Convention, supra note 78,
art. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1272. For a discussion of maritime boundaries in the
Aegean Sea, see D. BowETr, supra note 140, at 249-81.
213. See Cowell, supra note 1, at 4, col. 4.
214. See supra note 26.

215. Greek Application of Aug. 10, supra note 26, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 10.
216. I.d.; see Georgacopoulos, The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Problem: Presentation
of the Greek Case, 6 INT'L Bus. LAW. 479, 486-90 (1978) (arguing that the Greek islands

be given full effect in drawing an equidistance line between Greece and Turkey and
that the islands not be considered as special circumstances); Rozakis, The Greek-Turkish Dispute Over the Aegean Continental Shelf 9-11 (Law of the Sea Institute 'Occasional

Paper No. 27, 1975) (proposing delimitation should be effected by median line between Greek islands and mainland Turkey as supported by the Geneva Convention).
217. 1987 Greek Letter, supra note 55, at 6; see also supra text accompanying
notes 106-07.
218. The term "Eastern Islands" has been chosen for purposes of this Note.
The Eastern Islands are Samothrace, Limnos, Aghios Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios,
Psara, Antipsara, Samos, Ikaria, Fourni, Oinousae, and all the islands of the Dodecanese group with the exception of Astypalaia, Karpathos, and Kassos (this includes the
islands of Patmos, Leros, Kalimnos, Kos, Nisiros, Tilos, Simi, Chalki, Rhodes, Lipsi,
Castellorizo, Levitha, Arki, Alimia, Agathonision); see also the map on page 126.
219. This is evidenced by the exploration permits for petroleum granted to the
Turkish Petroleum Company by Turkey in the Aegean Sea. See maps in Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.Cj. Pleadings 13 (Greek Application of
Aug. 10, Annex I), reprintedfrom Turkish Government Official Gazette, July 18, 1974,
June 6, 1974, Nov. 1, 1973; see also Greek Note Verbale of Aug. 22, 1974, supra note
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key takes the position that the Greek islands situated near the
Anatolian coast do not possess a continental shelf of their own
and that all of the continental shelf in that area should accrue
to Turkey.2 20 It contends that the delimitation should be
based not only on purely legal considerations, but also on important political, economic, 2 2 ' and security considerations.2 2 2
Turkey argues that Greece possesses no sovereign rights in the
Aegean Sea beyond its own territorial waters.2 23 It further argues that the areas being explored by the Sismik I are contested
areas, and thus, the question of violating Greek sovereign
rights does not arise.2 2 4
B. Resolving the Dispute Under InternationalLaw
While Turkey is not a party to the Geneva Convention or
the 1982 Convention, these treaties are significant because
they identify international principles of general application.
Given that Greece and Turkey are unlikely to reach an
agreement on the continental shelf boundary, delimitation
should be effected by consensual recourse to a competent third
party.2 2 6 To reach an equitable result under customary international law, the circumstances should be analyzed according
to equitable criteria and practical methods.2 2 7
Greece and Turkey are geographically opposite states, except in the north, where they share a common undisputed land
boundary. The median-line method is most equitable in de6, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 28; Greek Note Verbale of Feb. 7, 1974, supra note 6, 1976
I.CJ. Pleadings at 21; Phylactopoulos, supra note 3, at 433, 441.
220. S.C. 1949th mtg., supra note 18, at 2; Greek Application of Aug. 10, 1976,
supra note 26, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at 3; Turkish Note Verbale of Feb. 27, 1974, supra
note 9, 1976 I.CJ. Pleadings at 23, 2 MEDITERRANEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF at 1520; see
Koymen, The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Problem: Presentationof the Turkish Case, 6 INT'L
Bus. LAw. 495 (1978) (arguing that the Greek islands be given no effect in a delimitation, because otherwise Turkey would be deprived of any shelf rights beyond its territorial sea and this would be irreconcilable with equitable principles).
221. But see Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 13,
41 (Judgment of June 3) (rejecting Malta's appeal to economic factors).
222. 31 U.N. SCOR (1950th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1950 (1976) [hereinafter S.C., 1950th mtg.].
223. Id.
224. S.C. 1949th mtg., supra note 18, at 3.
225. See supra notes 103-04 and text accompanying note 113.
226. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 246, 299 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
227. See id. at 300.
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limiting the continental shelf of states with opposite coasts.228
However, this initial median line must be adjusted in view of
the relevant circumstances of the area, such as the lengths of
the coasts, 2 29 the distance between the two coasts, 2 30 the general direction of the coast, 23 I and special circumstances such as
the existence of islands.232 In addition, a reasonable degree of
proportionality should be applied to check the fairness of the
final line.233
Geological or geomorphological characteristics constituting a fundamental discontinuity that terminates the extension
of the continental shelf of either country234 should not present
a problem, because the distance between the two countries
across the Aegean is less than 400 statute miles.235
The first step in drawing a median line between two states
is to identify the baselines and basepoints from which the me228. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 13, 47
(Judgment ofJune 3); United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case-First Decision
(U.K. v. Fr.), 54 I.L.R. 6, 66 (1977); North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W.
Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 36 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
229. See supra, notes 117, 130, 199 and accompanying text; Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.C.J. at 335. The continental shelf
rights are brought into effect by the maritime front of the landmass or its coastline
and not by the area of the landmass. Continental Shelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriyav. Malta),
1985 I.C.J. at 41. The Court had rejected the argument made by Libya that landmass
is a basis of entitlement to continental shelf rights. Id.
230. See Continental Shelf(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. at 46.

231. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. However, islets, rocks, and minor coastal projections may be ignored for delimitation purposes. Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 47.
233. See Continental Shelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriyav. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 49; Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 91 (Judgment of
Feb. 24).
234. The ICJ has pointed out that since a state is entitled to a minimum of 200
nautical miles of continental shelf from its coast, the geological or geomorphological
characteristics of areas within the 200 nautical miles is immaterial. Continental Shelf
(Libyan ArabJamahiriyav. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. at 35. In the Libyan-Maltese case the ICJ
rejected the "rift zone" argument made by Libya. Id. at 35, 37. The discontinuity
must be scientifically "fundamental" to constitute a discontinuity of natural prolongation in the legal sense. For example, a tectonic plate boundary would constitute a
fundamental discontinuity. Id. at 36. There is no such discernible feature in the seabed of the Aegean. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J.
Pleadings 93 (Argument of Aug. 25).
235. WEBSTER'S GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 9 (1967). One nautical mile equals
1.1508 statute miles. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 126 (2d

ed. Supp. 1979).
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dian line is to be drawn.2 3 6 The main difficulty in the Aegean
Sea is the identification of these baselines and basepoints. Because Turkey has no islands in the Aegean Sea except for Imbros and Tenedos, Turkey's basepoints for the purpose of
measuring the median line will lie along the baseline lawfully
established for the delimitation of the Turkish territorial sea.
Specifically, Turkey has proclaimed straight baselines around
its continental coast and coastal islands, along the eastern end
of the Aegean Sea.23 7 However, the contour of the Greek
baseline is unclear. Does it fall between the Greek islands and
the mainland of Turkey, or does it run somewhere between the
islands in the Aegean Sea? Under international law, the extent
to which islands are used as basepoints in determining a median line, depends on their location, size, population, political
and economic significance in relation to their state, their territorial seas and fishing regimes, their relation to the defense
and security of each nation, and their geological unity to the
state as a whole.2 3 8
The Greek islands collectively constitute approximately
twelve percent of the total population of Greece and nineteen
percent of the national territory. 2 39 The islands are politically
and economically an integral part of Greece. 240 All the islands
in the Aegean Sea west of the Turkish mainland, with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos, are under Greek sovereignty. 2 4 ' Some of the islands lie so close to the Turkish coast
236, See Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 6(1), 15 U.S.T. at 474, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316.
237. See supra note 78.
238. See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also Karl, Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf A Framework for Analysis, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1977)
(setting out a model of continental shelf delimitation involving islands that primarily
relies on the island's relative location and size).
239. Wagstaff, The GeographicalSetting, in GREECE IN THE 1980s 10, 21 (R. Clogg
ed. 1983).
240. Minutes of the Greek-Turkish Meetings of Jan. 31, 1976, reprinted in 2 MEDITERRANEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF 1556, 1558-59 (1988).

241. This is recognized and guaranteed by treaties to which both Greece and
Turkey are parties. Under article 12 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne, all
the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, except Tenedos, Imbros, the Rabbit Islands,
and the Dodecanese, were ceded to Greece. Under article 15, Turkey ceded the Dodecanese to Italy. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, arts. 12, 15, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, 21, 23.
Italy later ceded the Dodecanese to Greece. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10,
1947, art. 14, 61 Stat. 1369, 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1648, at 133, 49 U.N.T.S. 126, 134
[hereinafter Italy Treaty of Peace].
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that the territorial seas of the two countries overlap. In these
areas, the territorial sea between Greece and Turkey has already been delimited.24 2 Because of the proximity of some of
the Greek islands to the Turkish coast, both parties have raised
questions relating to national security. 24 3 Although national

security is not a decisive factor in placing the continental shelf
boundary, it may strengthen and support any geographical,
political, and legal circumstances. 244 Because the parties are
hostile to each other, Greece views any unilateral extension by
Turkey of its share of the continental shelf as a first step towards the annexation of the Eastern Islands.245
Perhaps the most decisive factor is the geographical configuration of the islands. Geographically, the Greek islands
can be divided into two groups. The first group of islands (the
"Western Islands") consists of all the islands west of the Eastern Islands, the vast majority of which lie within the territorial
waters of each other and whose territorial waters are linked to
the territorial waters of the Greek mainland. 46 The second
group, the Eastern Islands, 24 7 is located in the eastern half of
the Aegean Sea and is outside the territorial waters of mainland Greece.248
Under international law, the Western Islands should be
242. Italy and Turkey delimited the territorial sea between the Dodecanese
group and Turkey in 1932. Convention for the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters
Between the Coasts of Anatolia and the Island of Castellorizo, Jan. 4, 1932, ItalyTurkey, art. 5, 138 L.N.T.S. 243. Italy ceded the Dodecanese group to Greece after
World War II. Italy Treaty of Peace, supra note 241, art. 14, 61 Stat. at 1377, T.I.A.S.
No. 1648, at 133, 49 U.N.T.S. at 134. The territorial waters between the Turkish
mainland and the islands of Lesbos and Chios are delimited under international law
by the median-line method. See Law No. 476, supra note 78, art. 3, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, THE HIGH SEAS AND TO FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA at 128; 1982 Convention, supra note 78,

art. 15, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1273.
243. S.C. 1950th mtg., supra note 222, at 2; S.C. 1949th mtg., supra note 18, at 2.
244. See United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case-First Decision (U.K. v.
Fr.), 54 I.L.R. 6, 98 (1977); see also Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 3, 42 (Judgment of June 3) (accepting security as an equitable
consideration of and related to the concept of continental shelf).
245. S.C. 1949th mtg., supra note 18, at 2.
246. See map on page 126. Seven out of the 55 Western Islands are not connected to the territorial waters that are linked to the territorial waters of the Greek
mainland.
247. See supra note 218.
248. See map on page 126.
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granted full effect and used as the basepoints of continental
Greece, because their territorial waters are linked to the territorial waters of mainland Greece. 24 9 The Turkish islands of
Tenedos and Imbros should also be given full effect because
their territorial waters are connected to the territorial waters of
Turkey.
Under international law, enclaving, giving half effect, or
giving full effect to the Eastern Islands are possible solutions.
The enclave solution has so far been adopted only once-by
the Court of Arbitration, with respect to the Channel Islands in
the Anglo-French case. 250 However, the situation of the Channel
Islands is different. First, the Channel Islands are clearly territorial and political units separate from the mainland of the
United Kingdom. 25 ' Although they are not constitutionally

part of the United Kingdom itself, they are direct dependencies of the British Crown.2 5 2 So great is their political, legisla249. See supra notes 141-42, 168-69, 246 and accompanying text; Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings 80, 97-99 (Argument of
Aug. 25); Greek Application of Aug. 10, 1976, supra note 26, 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings at
10. Greece argues that all the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea should be given full
effect.
The islands in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissaucase are similarly situated geographically
to the islands in the Aegean case. See supra text accompanying notes 179-85. Specifically, the Bijagos Archipelago, which is located directly off the shore of Guinea-Bissau and connected to the continent's territorial waters, see supra text accompanying
notes 183-84, is geographically similar to the Cyclades Archipelago and to the other
islands whose territorial waters are connected to each other and the territorial waters
of mainland Greece. However, even though the tribunal did not explicitly give full
effect to the Bijagos Archipelago, because it did not apply a lateral equidistance line,
see supra text accompanying note 188, it did account for the Bijagos Archipelago as an
element in determining the general direction of the entire coastline of the country, see
supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text, and as an important factor when drawing
a perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, see supra text accompanying
notes 193-95; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and GuineaBissau, 25 I.L.M. 251, 293 (1985).
Unlike the method used in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau,which viewed the whole West
African coast and took overall account of its coastline, see supra text accompanying
notes 189-90, the equidistance method, or median-line rule, is more applicable to the
situation in the Aegean. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. First, Greece and
Turkey are opposite states. Second, there is no need to account for future delimitations in the region, because Greece and Turkey are the only two states that share the
Aegean seabed. Third, there is no possibility of enclaving either state's coast, since
there are no other states adjacent to Greece or Turkey in the Aegean Sea.
250. D. BOWErr, supra note 140, at 178.
251. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case-First Decision (U.K. v.
Fr.), 54 I.L.R. 6, 96 (1977).
252. Id.
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tive, administrative, and economic autonomy, that the United
Kingdom had asked the Court of Arbitration to regard them as
distinct island states for the purpose of determining the continental shelf appurtenant to them. 53
Second, the use of the enclave method depends on the
number of islands and their location.254 While there are four
principal Channel Islands,255 there are eighty main islands in
the Aegean Sea. 2 56 The court viewed the Channel Islands as
geographically detached from the United Kingdom; 257 it noted
that a clustered group of islands should be treated differently
from a group of islands stretching along the coast of another
state. 258 The Channel Islands form a small group off the coast
of France in the English Channel, while the Eastern Islands
stretch out along the full extent of the Turkish coast.
The English Channel and the Aegean Sea are geographically dissimilar. Although the United Kingdom and France
have approximately equal coast lengths along the Channel,259
Greece's coast length in the Aegean Sea is longer than Turkey's. 260 The general direction of Greece's southern coast, including the Cyclades Archipelago and the northern mainland
coast, engulfs the eight Greek islands off Turkey in the North
Aegean Sea. By contrast, the Channel Islands are practically
engulfed by the French coast. While the median line, giving
full effect to the Channel Islands, between France and the
United Kingdom would automatically deviate southward in a
long loop around the Channel Islands,26 ' the grant of full ef253. Id.
254. Id. at 102.
255. See CONCISE

COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA

155 (1983).

256. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF GREECE 2-3 (1983). Of the over 2,000 islands

in the Aegean Sea, 80 of the approximately 160 inhabited ones are considered main
islands. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 524 (1983); see also Wagstaff,

supra note 239, at 10.
257. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 102.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 96.
260. Turkey's Aegean coastline is 3,484 km. Erol, Turkey and Cyprus, in

THE

WORLD'S COASTLINE 491 (1985). The total Aegean coastline is 10,943 km. THREAT
IN THE AEGEAN

15 (Athens Daily Newspapers Journalists' Union). The Greek Aegean

continental coastline, discounting the islands, is 3,960 km. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF GREECE 2-3 (1983); see also Karl, supra note 238, at 672 nn. 117-18.

261. United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. at 98.
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fect to the Eastern Islands in the Aegean will not cause the
median line to deviate to such a large extent.
Thus,. the territorial and political unity of the Greek islands with the Greek mainland, their vast number and location,
the shape and length of the respective coasts of Greece and
Turkey around the Aegean Sea, are all factors demonstrating
that an enclave solution would not achieve an equitable solution.
Another possibility is granting the Eastern Islands half effect. The purpose of granting half effect 1.o islands is to shift
the median line towards the state with the offshore island in
order to allow more continental shelf to the opposite state.
Thus, in the Aegean Sea, the median line would be drawn
closer to Greece to allow Turkey, the opposite state, to claim
more continental shelf. This solution presents difficulties because granting half effect to the Eastern Islands would result in
enclaving some of them.2 6 2 Granting full effect to the Eastern
263
Islands is also difficult to justify under international law.
State practice and international case law seem to indicate that
something less than full effect be granted to islands that lie
closer to the coast of an opposite state than to the state of
64
which they belong.
In this case the best solution is to draw a median line by
granting half effect to the Eastern Islands without enclaving
them. 26 5 This would require a western limit beyond which
point the median line could not cross. The western limit
262. Half effect would probably enclave the island of Lesbos and possibly enclave the islands of Aghios Eustratios, Psara, and Chios.
263, See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. Other than the Channel
Islands, there are not many cases in which the islands belonging to one state are in
closer proximity to the opposite state. An example of such a case under state practice
is the agreement between Italy and Tunisia. Four of the Italian islands lie closer to
Tunisia than to Sicily. Under this agreement, the islands were not enclaved, however
they were not given full effect either. Instead, the existing boundary around the islands was extended to link their shelf to the continental shelf of Sicily. Agreement
Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Tunisia-Italy, Aug. 20, 1971,
1978 I.T.G.U. 191, reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA - MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS at 174, U.N. Sales No. E.87.V.12 (1987).
264. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
265. This would be achieved by measuring a median line from Turkey's straight
baselines, giving full effect to Tenedos and Imbros, and from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of Greece is measured, giving full effect to the
Western Islands. Another median line should be drawn from Turkey's straight baselines and from Greece's baselines, giving full effect to the Eastern Islands. The line
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would be an imaginary line linking the Eastern Islands by the
western limit of their six-nautical-mile territorial sea. The eastern limit would be a median line between Greece and Turkey
giving full effect to the Eastern Islands. The half effect median
line should be bounded on the east and the west between these
two limits.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the latter half of this century, when an increasing number of countries have claimed the right to explore and
exploit their continental shelves, the legal means of delimiting
such a shelf shared by two or more countries has begun to
crystallize. Although the international community has not defined a method that mandatorily applies, international case law
and the 1982 Convention have paved the way towards a general application of all facts and circumstances to achieve fairness in each specific case.
The very real danger that the Aegean dispute might lead
to armed conflict between Greece and Turkey was demonstrated in 1976 and again in 1987. The expressed willingness
of both countries to work towards a negotiated settlement and
to refrain from provocative action has recently broken down.
International law indicates that the delimitation of the boundary of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea appertaining to
the two countries should be effected by the method of a median line, because the two states are primarily opposite. This
median line should give half effect to the Eastern Islands but
should not enclave them.
Aurelia A. Georgopoulos*
drawn halfway between these two median lines is a boundary giving half effect to the
Eastern Islands.
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Fordham University School of Law.
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